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Chapter 2
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Abstract This chapter compares social models in Europe and Latin America. The 
goal is to study the interaction between two institutions: on the one hand, pre- 
distributive (ex ante) institutions, such as the structure and coverage of collective 
bargaining and, on the other hand, post-distributive (ex post) institutions, such as 
unemployment protection and social policy. Pre-distributive institutions are impor-
tant for correcting inequalities in the labour market, because they introduce guide-
lines for egalitarian wage structures. Post-distributive institutions help to mitigate 
inequalities generated in the labour market.
The methodology is based on statistical analysis of a series of indicators related 
to pre and post-distributive policies. The results present three types of model: (1) 
coordinated economies, typical of neo-corporatist Scandinavian countries; (2) 
mixed economies, typical of Mediterranean systems, and (3) uncoordinated econo-
mies, which equate to liberalism and the Latin American ‘structural heterogeneity’ 
model. It is neo-corporatist coordinated economies that generate the most pre and 
post-distributive equality. In turn, uncoordinated economies, and Latin American 
ones in particular, generate more inequalities due to highly informal employment 
and the weakness of their post-distributive institutions.
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2.1  Introduction
The aim of this chapter is to define the institutional characteristics of the coordina-
tion of social models to explain pre and post-distributive inequalities. The purpose 
is to offer a conceptual framework for comparison between the institutions and 
inequalities in the member countries of the INCASI project, both in Europe and 
Latin America.
Regulatory institutions that work to correct inequalities can be divided into two 
groups depending on when they operate: (1) those that are designed to directly act 
ex ante upon the source of inequalities in the labour market, and which we call pre- 
distributive, and (2) those that do so ex post, i.e. that act to mitigate inequalities that 
have already been generated in the labour market, and which we call post- distributive 
(Hacker 2011; Zalakain and Barragué 2017). In other words, we seek to observe the 
interaction between labour relations and welfare systems. By doing so, we hope to 
get closer to finding an explanation for social inequalities and the ways they can be 
mitigated (Esping-Andersen 1990, 2000). In a way, this chapter compares different 
kinds of capitalism by comparing their social institutions (Menz 2008; Burroni 
2016), although different kinds of capitalism are not only explained by their institu-
tions, but also by their historical and cultural characteristics, their financial struc-
tures and their ties to the world economy (Schneider 2009).
This study is guided by two questions: (1) What are the institutional mechanisms 
for coordination between the labour market and social protection? (2) How were 
inequalities managed between 2007 and 2017 in the European and Latin American 
countries that have been participating in the INCASI project?
In the late nineteenth century, social inequality was such a big issue in the west 
that it gave rise to the so-called “social question” (Castel 1997). In the twentieth 
century, the bulk of European and Latin American states built institutional architec-
tures that were designed to mitigate social inequalities and which (albeit modified) 
still exist today. Historically, this architecture has been designed from two 
perspectives.
First, the labour movement and trade unionism have sought to find a response to 
inequalities through the institutional recognition of individual and collective labour 
rights (Barragué 2017). The institutionalisation of labour relations (which before 
then had been managed on an individual basis) has therefore played a fundamental 
role in improving the bargaining power of trade unions (Hyman 2000). This institu-
tionalisation played a historically important role (after World War II) by establish-
ing strong opposition to business organisations and the state. The institutionalised 
involvement of social actors paved the way for political exchange and the social 
pact between capital and labour in order to reduce pre-distributive inequalities in the 
labour market.
Secondly, political parties and parliaments have sought to respond to post- 
distributive inequalities through social protection institutions (unemployment ben-
efits, pensions, sick pay, etc.) whose goal, put briefly, has been to mitigate the social 
inequalities that are generated by a market economy (Barragué 2017; Ferdosi 2019).
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After this introduction, the chapter is divided into four sections. The first deals 
with the conceptualisation of pre and post-distributive institutions. In the second 
section, we propose a model for comparative analysis between 26 countries that are 
part of the context to which the INCASI members belong, and which is built around 
the chosen set of indicators that are detailed in this section. The third part presents 
the results of the comparative study and the formalisation of models that reflect the 
institutional architecture used to manage inequality. Finally, the fourth section 
offers some conclusions.
2.2  Conceptualisation
The concept of pre-distribution has a long history linked to the development of the 
labour and trade union movement. One of the biggest milestones for improving the 
social status of workers concerned labour contracts. The shift from labour contracts 
governed by Civil or Commercial Law to labour contracts regulated by Labour Law 
in the nineteenth century and the early decades of the twentieth century was one of 
the greatest achievements of the trade union movement (Herpple 1994). This social 
advance came together with union rights, such as the right to representation, collec-
tive bargaining and participation of workers’ representatives in socio-economic 
institutions. In short, those historical achievements helped to boost the influence of 
workers on the labour market and pre-distributive policy.
The inter-classist alliance between trade unions (working classes) and political 
parties (middle classes) has played a fundamental role in the development of pre- 
distributive policies, and in both Europe and Latin America has marked different 
political movements, such as social democracy, Christian democracy, communism, 
developmentalism and even other historic national movements such as Peronism 
and Vargism, to name but a few (Horowith 2011). There have been two particularly 
important milestones for progress in the rights of representation, participation, 
information, consultation and collective bargaining: the Treaty of Versailles in 1919 
and the ILO Declaration in Philadelphia in 1944. Both events led to the expansion 
of pre-distributive institutions in European and some Latin American countries. In 
other words, they led to the social integration of the market (Polanyi 1989) and the 
subordination of the labour market to politics (Hyman 2018). One result of this 
process is that trade unions have specialised in action on pre-distributive policies 
and political parties have specialised in post-distributive action. However, both 
kinds of action are nevertheless complementary. The mechanism for coordination in 
the labour market is collective bargaining, which can serve to reduce inequalities 
(Molina and Rhodes 2007).
The current debate is polarised. On the one hand, the liberal movement has 
emphasised the role of pre-distributive strategies, while the social-democratic and 
left-wing spheres have emphasised articulation between the classes in order to coor-
dinate pre and post-distributive policies. Today, the need to coordinate pre and post 
distributive policies is especially topical due to the extent of austerity policies in 
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Europe. Three factors explain the difficulties faced by post-distributive policies: (1) 
globalisation, which makes capital and consequently the application of the right tax 
redistribution policy hard to control; (2) unstable jobs and subsequent wage devalu-
ation; (3) digitalisation and technological innovations that are changing occupa-
tional structures (Hacker 2011). The response to these difficulties with 
post-distributive policies involves examining pre-distributive policies in order to 
correct inequalities ex ante, whereby “it is better to prevent than to cure” 
(Barragué 2017).
In short, in this conceptualisation we shall analyse two dimensions (Fig. 2.1): (1) 
pre-distributive institutions, which include the labour market and collective bar-
gaining, and which may or may not help to reduce inequalities; and (2) post- 
distributive institutions, which refer to the functions of the Welfare State in European 
countries or otherwise the application by the state of social policies in Latin America. 
The concept of pre and post-distribution has been taken up once again since the 
study by Hacker (2011), and is featuring ever more prominently in the literature 
(Barragué 2013, 2017). These concepts are relevant to comparative studies because 
they can be used to explain the current reforms and trends in social policies (Zalakain 
and Barragué 2017).
2.2.1  Pre-distributive Institutions
As already mentioned, the pre-distributive dimension refers to the institutions, stan-
dards and procedures that aim to correct inequalities in the labour market (Hacker 
2011). The labour market is one of the sources of income inequality as a result of 
Fig. 2.1 Social model. Analytical conceptualization. Source: own elaboration
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formal or informal employment, as well as job quality. The market generates poten-
tially huge wage differences, with a greater or lesser risk of poverty. In particular, 
formal or informal employment is related to differences in people’s economic 
uncertainty in terms of income and professional careers. We therefore assume that 
there are countries with labour markets that generate more inequalities than others 
in terms of opportunities for employment and job quality, informality, stability or 
instability, as we shall see later in the comparison between countries.
The main pre-distributive institution in our societies is collective bargaining 
between employers and unions, which helps to improve wages and labour condi-
tions. According to Piketty (2014: 392) an understanding of the history of the reduc-
tion of inequalities needs to consider developments in the minimum wage, labour 
standards, collective bargaining, professional qualifications, technological innova-
tion and increased productivity. In short, the labour market is a “social construct 
based on specific rules and compromises” of a political and unionist nature.
Another institution involved in the coordination between the labour market and 
social protection policy is tripartism (employers’ organizations, trade unions and 
governments),1 which in many countries takes the form of Economic and Social 
Councils, or Wage Councils, which frequently adopt a typically neo-corporatist 
institutional structure, which is important for the coordination of economic policy 
(Menz 2008; Burroni 2016). In other words, neo-corporatism is a form of institu-
tionalisation of social consensus that involves the government, businesses, unions 
and even consumer organisations. Hence, countries with neo-corporatist structures 
are known as coordinated economies (Hall and Soskice 2001). In short, we could 
say that institutions such as social consensus, collective bargaining and social distri-
bution systems, can be used to achieve relative decommodification of labour 
(Esping-Andersen 2000).
2.2.2  Post-distributive Institutions
The post-distributive dimension refers to ex post policies aimed at mitigating 
inequalities that were generated in society beforehand, such as unemployment ben-
efit, health and maternity insurance and benefits, pensions, and disability benefits, 
as well as subsidies that seek to correct and mitigate financial inequalities and the 
risk of poverty. The institutions involved in the post-distributive dimension are 
social security, public employment services, vocational training and retraining cen-
tres, etc. In short, what is defined as the Welfare State in Europe, or ‘State Action’ 
in terms of the implementation of social policies in Latin America.
The austerity programmes that have been promoted in Europe since 2007 have 
led to post-distributive policy characterised by the overburdening of unemployment 
1 Tripartism is a concept used by the ILO to refer to the Social Dialogue between government, 
employers and trade unions and their participation in certain institutions. The term is sometimes 
used to illustrate the inexistence of neo-corporatist structures.
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benefit systems due to such high unemployment rates (Hacker 2011), as well as 
temporary work contracts causing people to continually register and unregister for 
benefits. The Great Recession has led to more social expenditure and high public 
debts derived from the payment of pensions and subsidies to prevent severe poverty 
(Ferdosi 2019). In this context it can reasonably be imagined that national govern-
ments and the European Union would encourage pre-distributive policies rather 
than post-distributive ones. Examples of this are so-called private occupational 
pension schemes (Natali et al. 2018a, b), i.e. retirement pensions and the provision 
of health, educational and professional retraining services through capitalisation 
while people are in active employment (Martín Artiles and Molina 2015).
2.2.3  Coordinated and Uncoordinated Economies
As part of the debate on the varieties of capitalism and from the concept of 
coordinated- uncoordinated economies, we differentiate between four models in our 
analysis.
2.2.3.1  Strong Neo-Corporatism
Coordinated economies typically have institutions for bilateral (employers-unions) 
or tripartite (including the government) collective bargaining in which labour and 
pay conditions are negotiated in a centralised manner (Molina and Rhodes 2007; 
Menz 2008, among others). Coordinated economies are better equipped to coordi-
nate macroeconomic policy and to control the behaviour of wages and inflation, but 
also to link such policy with the goals of redistributive social policy. Burroni (2016: 
55) summarises the strong neo-corporatism of northern Europe in terms of the fol-
lowing characteristics: (1) existence of a strong workers’ movement organised 
through coordinated and representative unions; (2) unions supported by high mem-
bership rates and that are well-established in the public sector (education, health and 
public administration); (3) trade unions and employers’ organisations with major 
institutional involvement in the formal and informal regulation of the labour market; 
(4) relations between social actors that are predominantly centralised at the national 
level, generating an umbrella to protect collective bargaining at lower levels, such 
as the activity sector and company levels.
This model represents strong institutionalisation of trade unions, and their high 
membership rates are related to their co-management of occupational pension funds 
and unemployment benefits. This model is called the Ghent System, after the city 
where it was first implemented (Ghailini and Peña-Casas 2018). In short, the coor-
dinated economies of strong neo-corporatist countries typically involve agreement 
between social actors on financial, fiscal and industrial policy in a coordinated man-
ner with the control of inflation and wages. This, in turn is coordinated with welfare 
measures, social expenditure, public services and active employment policies 
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(Smith 1999). Therefore, social dialogue between employers, unions and govern-
ments plays an important role in macroeconomic governance. This coordinated pro-
cedure is still very much alive and well in Scandinavian countries.
In some countries, economic policy is centralised and coordinated at the national 
level (Scandinavian countries), in others it is done at the mesosocial, sector-national 
level (for example, in Germanic countries, Spain and Italy). Coordinated economies 
not only require centralisation of collective bargaining, but also for unions and 
employers’ organisations to be coordinated at different levels, so that decisions can 
be made and demands can be coordinated from the bottom all the way to the top, 
which is why we speak of organised capitalism or social integration in the market 
(Polanyi 1989; Albert 1991; Hall and Soskice 2001). These countries therefore have 
high union membership, and the countries of the so-called Ghent System or strong 
neo-corporatism (Sweden, Norway, Denmark, Finland and Belgium) are paradig-
matic examples of this, where capital and labour have a long-term strategic commit-
ment to certain employment, social protection and labour peace goals (Smith 1999). 
In short, this is the result of the political exchange between capital and labour. We 
could therefore deduce, like Calmfors and Driffill (1988), that countries with highly 
coordinated economies are the ones the lowest wage dispersion.
Other countries like Germany and Austria fit an intermediate model of sector- 
level neo-corporatism (Menz 2008). These countries typically feature strong institu-
tionalisation of social conflict, which is guided by procedural regulations that tame 
the ways in which conflict is expressed (Esping-Andersen 2000). However, in oppo-
sition to this institutionalisation of conflict, the state and businesses are committed 
to correcting inequalities (ex ante) through collective bargaining and social dia-
logue. Put briefly, it is a case of correcting inequalities in the labour market itself, 
either through collective bargaining of a minimum wage or by agreeing with the 
government to a minimum inter-professional wage or through the legal extension of 
agreements in the form of Erga Omnes clauses.
2.2.3.2  Mixed Coordination
Some authors (Schneider 2009) have proposed the idea of  hybrid or mixed econo-
mies to explain the semi-coordinated and market hierarchy forms of labour markets 
in Mediterranean countries. In greater detail, Molina and Rhodes (2007) consider 
the existence in Spain and Italy of a third type of mixed economy, with systems for 
coordinating wage policy through collective bargaining at the macroeconomic level, 
but with major incoordination and disorganisation in certain segments of the micro-
economic level, such as small businesses, although the government tends to correct 
dysfunctions in the coordination between the macro and micro levels with such 
instruments as the regulation of the minimum wage and the general efficacy of col-
lective agreements that acquire the force of law. Unions and employers’ associa-
tions hold major political influence, but in these countries the volume of informal 
employment is a certain burden that hinders the coordination of collective bargain-
ing, the treatment of wages and the taxation of labour.
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2.2.3.3  Uncoordinated Economies
In contrast to the aforesaid coordinated neo-corporatist economies, there are other 
liberal countries (United Kingdom, Ireland and the United States, from the central 
countries, Chile, Peru, Mexico and Colombia, from Latin American countries, 
among others) that are considered uncoordinated market economies (Hall and 
Soskice 2001). In these, the labour conditions are mainly set on the basis of the free 
interplay between supply and demand in the labour market. The market is viewed as 
a principle of social and self-regulated order that by its own internal logic leans 
towards balance and efficiency. Therefore, any state intervention that is not aimed at 
ensuring institutional conditions for supposedly fair and healthy competition is seen 
to be counterproductive because it artificially alters internal market logic.
It is relevant to note that in these liberal societies there are also decentralised col-
lective bargaining institutions at the company level, but this implies greater wage 
dispersion. The decentralisation of collective bargaining has historically enabled 
these societies to adjust wages to companies’ specific levels of productivity, which 
also offers the comparative advantage of more flexible labour conditions and more 
rapid adjustment of the economy (Calmfors and Driffill 1988). On the other hand, 
as a negative outcome, these countries have greater inequality in the labour market. 
They typically have weaker unions and employers’ organisations in what is known 
as unorganised capitalism (Albert 1991; Hall and Soskice 2001). In short, policies 
depend more on the labour market and less on social agreements between govern-
ment, unions and business.
2.2.3.4  Latin America, the Burden of Informality
In Argentina, Brazil and Uruguay there are also institutions of corporatist origin that 
play a certain role in collective bargaining. Unions have political influence, albeit 
fragmented. These countries cannot be considered to have coordinated economies 
because their high volume of informal labour and employment prevents effective 
coordination of collective bargaining, wage policy and taxation of wages. This hin-
ders pre and post distribution. We are therefore talking about a strong duality 
between employment and wages in the formal sector, which is relatively negotiated 
with trade unions, and a high volume of informal labour. This duality is a form of 
labour market segmentation, which in Latin America is viewed as a kind of 
Structural Heterogeneity (Presbich 1981) or Hierarchical Market Economy 
(Schneider 2009: 555). The concept of structural heterogeneity is more complex 
and important: it is defined not only by the segmentation of the labour market, but 
also by the coexistence of vestiges of pre-capitalist economies of an informal and 
non-mercantile nature in sectors whose productivity is lower than others, which in 
turn generates major social inequality. The origin of this concept can be found in 
Presbich (1981), who as early as the 1960s was relating structural heterogeneity to 
the imbalanced exchange between the developed centre and underdeveloped periph-
eral economies (Nohlen and Sturm 1982; Cena 2010; Cimoli and Porcile 2019). The 
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main conditioners of Latin American capitalism are dependence on the foreign 
export of raw materials, an under-qualified workforce and atomised labour relations 
(Schneider 2009: 554).
Meanwhile, in the case of Argentina, Brazil and Uruguay, it seems more appro-
priate to speak of tripartism, which expresses the idea of  the existence of social 
dialogue between government, unions and business, with participation in certain 
social institutions. But we must stress that these are still dualised and hierarchical 
economies. This model gained importance from the 1940s. Martinez Fronzoni and 
Sánchez-Ancochea (2018: 204) characterise these countries as universalist- stratified 
or conservative-informal regimes. The idea of  ‘conservative’ comes from the way 
they draw on the Bismarkian model, based on access to protection via labour status, 
which is financially tripartite, and grounded on a contributory system, but they are 
unequal due to the high volume of informal employment, which leaves a large num-
ber of people unprotected.
2.3  Analysis Model
Based on the above conceptualisation, we establish a general hypothesis where we 
understand that liberal regimes, with a decentralised bargaining system and no wage 
coordination, are more unequal than countries with centralised neo-corporatist 
regimes. On the contrary, neo-corporatist regimes, with centralised collective bar-
gaining and high coverage rates tend to reduce inequalities in terms of wages and 
working conditions.
Moreover, countries with a high volume of informal employment, as is the case 
of those in Latin America, are expected to lack the capacity to govern wage behav-
iour, and neither do their workers have sufficient capacity to contribute to social 
protection systems that offer coverage for unemployment or retirement.
To test this general hypothesis, we constructed an analysis model based on four 
dimensions: institutional coordination mechanisms, pre-distributive indicators, 
post-distributive indicators and income inequalities, as shown in Table 2.1.
The institutional dimension includes two indicators:
 1. Wage coordination. This variable is divided into five categories, following the 
database produced by Visser (2018). Countries that have a stable centralised 
framework at the national level to fix the rise in wages in a certain range, or oth-
erwise where wages are imposed by government decision, have been given a 
score of 5, which indicates high centralisation of collective bargaining. 
Meanwhile, 1 equates to decentralisation of collective bargaining at the company 
level. The other values indicate intermediate positions in the scale. The value 4 
category indicates the existence of bipartite negotiation between employers and 
unions and sets standard wages for collective bargaining at the sector and com-
pany level. This group includes the countries grouped under the neo-corporatist 
model, such as Austria and Germany, which has been characterised by a form of 
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Social Partnership consisting of a tradition of sector-level agreement between 
Chambers of Commerce, business organisations and unions (Menz 2008). At 
level 3 we have countries that agree on the coordination of wages in an irregu-
lar manner, depending on the economic circumstances or crisis situations. 
Centralised coordination is limited, but the wage decisions at the company 
level are also limited, as is the case, for example, in Spain, Italy, Argentina, 
Uruguay and Brazil, among others. Level 2 equates to weak wage coordina-
tion, which is based on activity sector agreements in coordination with com-
pany agreements, or sometimes both levels, as is the case in France. And 
finally, at level 1 we have liberal countries (such as the United Kingdom, 
Ireland, the United States, Chile and Mexico), which only set wages at the 
company level, according to their level of productivity, which is viewed as the 
flexible model (Calmfors and Driffill 1988). In short, these five categories 
involve measurement of strongly coordinated neo- corporatist economies ver-
sus liberal uncoordinated economies.
 2. The coverage rate of collective bargaining. The considered variable refers to the 
percentage of workers covered by collective bargaining agreements. This indica-
tor shows the degree of application of agreements and reveals the monitoring, 
discipline and efficacy of organisations when it comes to applying wage agree-
ments and labour conditions. It is a relatively important indicator, and is justified 
here because it indicates an aspect of the influence and power of trade unions, as 
well as their degree of unification and coordination of levels of negotiation 
between company, sector and state (Esping-Andersen 2000).
The pre-distributive dimension considers employment to be the main compo-
nent, as it is the principal means of social integration and access to social rights 
Table 2.1 Dimensions, variables and sources
Dimension/Variables Sources
Institutional mechanism
1. Level of coordination of Collective 
Bargaining (1 = company versus 
5 = pick level)
2. Coverage rate of collective 
bargaining
Institutional Characteristics of Trade Unions, Wages 
setting, State Intervention and Social Pacts (ICTWSS) 
2018 (Visser 2018)
Pre-distributive
3. Occupied rate
4. Informal occupational rate
ILOSTAT (2018)
ILOSTAT (2018); CEDLAS L.A. American Bank U
Post-distributive
5. Social expenses in % of GDP
6. Coverage rate of Unemployment 
protection
Eurostat 2018 y Cedlas World Bank L.A. 2018
OCDE Outlook 2018
Eurostat 2018 and Cedlas World Bank, L.A. 2018
Inequality of income
7. Labour Gini Laboral, pre-distribution
8. Gini Post-distribution
Eurostat 2018 and Cedlas World Bank, L.A. 2018
Eurostat 2018 and Cedlas World Bank, L.A. 2018
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(Esping-Andersen 2000). Employment can also be a source of social inequality, 
which is why we take two variables:
 3. The employment rate. Indicates how employable a society is.
 4. The informal employment rate. Informal employment is an obstacle to redistri-
bution because it excludes tax payments as required to fund certain contributory 
welfare state systems.
The post-distributive dimension includes the following two indicators:
 5. Expenditure on social policies. Variable that includes spending on subsidies and 
transfers to families. The level of social expenditure over GDP indicates the 
capacity of Welfare States to correct or mitigate the inequalities generated by the 
labour market (Esping-Andersen 2000; Del Pino and Rubio 2016).
 6. The unemployment benefit coverage rate, which is an indicator of correction of 
the inequalities generated by the loss of employment and which is an important 
policy for combatting severe poverty.
Finally, the income inequality dimension involves two indicators:
 7. The labour, or pre-distributive, Gini Index, to show inequalities in income from 
labour before transfers.
 8. The post-labour, or post-distributive Gini Index, after transfers, which shows the 
inequalities in the labour market and how effective post-distributive policies are 
at correcting them.
This set of indicators has been analysed using a selection of 26 countries as 
shown in the data in Table 2.2.
2.4  Results: A Comparative Study
2.4.1  Context and Trends of Inequalities 2007–2017
A first contrast between Latin American and European countries that have partici-
pated in the INCASI project is the context and the different impact of the financial 
crisis, known as the Great Recession in European countries, but not in Latin 
America. The differences in impact can be seen through changes in the indicator of 
gross domestic product per capita, measured in constant euros in purchasing power 
parity (see Table 2.3) and which also shows the differences in the levels of wealth 
between countries. In European countries the recession is reflected by the drop in 
gross domestic product per capita between 2007 and 2013, the lowest point of the 
recession. As shown in said Table 2.3, Spain, Italy, France, Finland and the United 
Kingdom recessed in that period. But from 2013 to 2018 the GDP per capita slowly 
started to rise again in those European countries.
In contrast, Latin American countries witnessed growth in GDP per capita 
between 2007 and 2013, except Mexico, which was stagnant. From 2013 to 2018, 
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the economies of Argentina and Brazil seem to recede somewhat, while Chile, 
Uruguay and Mexico underwent moderate growth. So, the economic cycles were 
different in the two continents. Throughout the decade, the countries with the great-
est growth were Uruguay (40%), Chile (14%) and Argentina (13%), while it was the 
European countries where there was the least growth. Even in Italy and Finland, 
GDP per capita fell by −10% and −3% respectively.
2.4.1.1  Changes in Inequalities
Table 2.4 offers a comparative overview of the evolution of the pre-distributive and 
post-distributive Gini Index. Throughout the studied period, two opposing trends 
are observed. For the Europe of the Great Recession as a whole, income inequality 
was practically maintained or slightly increased, while in Latin America there was 
no talk of a crisis, but instead a period of expansion that led to a moderate reduction 
in inequalities.
These global results differ somewhat by country (Table 2.5 and 2.6). In Spain, 
the gap between the labour and post-labour Gini Index was 0.031 in 2009. By 2017, 
the labour Gini had increased on the 2009 level, which reflects the large amount of 
unemployment in the period and the country’s hard wage devaluation policy. 
However, social expenditure managed to reduce the gap by 0.040 points. In France, 
Table 2.3 Gross domestic product/Total population in average constant income in euros PPP 
constant (2018)
Country 2007 2013 2018 Difference 2007–2018 (%)
Argentina 21.858 26.848 24.775 13.30
Brazil 17.583 19.475 17.199 −2.20
Chile 23.497 26.537 26.872 14.30
Uruguay 18.311 24.113 25.661 40.10
Mexico 23.540 23.270 24.059 2.20
Spain 36.634 32.710 37.839 3.20
Italy 39.644 34.908 35.916 −10.50
France 41.444 40.906 42.808 3.20
United Kingdom 43.205 41.652 44.479 2.90
Finland 46.208 42.333 44.471 −3.80
Source: World Inequalities data base ( 2020)
Table 2.4 Comparative inequalities
Continent Gini 2007 2017
Europe Pre 0.3608 0.3688
Post 0.3058 0.3090
Latin America Pre 0.5204 0.4940
Post 0.4808 0.4488
Source: Own elaboration with cited data
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the labour Gini Index barely changed between 2009 and 2017, where social expen-
diture was able to significantly reduce the differences between 2009 and 2017. In 
Italy, the labour Gini Index rose between 2009 and 2017, which also reflects the 
high volume of youth unemployment. The difference from the Gini Index after 
transfers was the lowest of the five countries considered, which is an indicator of the 
reduction in social expenditure. In Finland, the differences in the labour Gini also 
increased between 2009 and 2018, but in both years social expenditure achieved a 
sharp reduction in the post-transfer Gini Index. Finally, in the United Kingdom the 
labour Gini Index was the highest, both in 2009 and 2017, reflecting greater inequal-
ity in the labour market, which correlates with the decentralised collective bargain-
ing system. However, the decrease in the post-labour Gini was considerably large in 
both years.
All the chosen European countries, through participation in the INCASI project, 
made an effort to reduce the divide between the two indicators of inequality, with 
Finland being the country that made the biggest effort, even though it has the least 
inequality.
Table 2.5 Pre and post-distributive Gini Index. European countries
Country Year Pre Post Difference
Spain 2009 0.360 0.329 0.031
2017 0.381 0.341 0.040
France 2009 0.356 0.299 0.057
2017 0.357 0.293 0.064
Italy 2009 0.336 0.318 0.018
2017 0.349 0.327 0.022
Finland 2009 0,338 0.259 0.079
2017 0.343 0.253 0.090
UK 2009 0.414 0.324 0.090
2017 0.414 0.331 0.083
Source: own elaboration based on Eurostat 2019
Table 2.6 Inequalities in Latin America: Gini Index
Country Year Pre Post Diferencia
Argentina 2007 0.484 0.457 0.027
2017 0.457 0.413 0.044
Brasil 2007 0.566 0.548 0.018
2016 0.544 0.530 0.015
Chile 2007 0.513 0.460 0.053
2015 0.501 0.431 0.069
México 2006 0.510 0.489 0.021
2014 0.515 0.513 0.002
Uruguay 2007 0.529 0.450 0.079
2016 0.453 0.357 0.096
Source: SEDLAC (CEDLAS and The World Bank)
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In the Latin American countries, the distances between the two types of Gini 
were also lower thanks to the period of economic expansion. In Argentina, Brazil, 
Chile and Uruguay, inequalities in both indicators were reduced between 2007 and 
2017, boosted by the social policies of progressive governments, as also confirmed 
in the study by Amarante et al. (2018). However, in Mexico the inequalities reflected 
in the labour and post-labour Gini Index increased in the same period. In general, 
we can consider Latin America, in the words of Martinez Fronzoni and Sánchez- 
Ancochea (2018: 201), “the region of the world with the greatest inequality com-
pared to the world average”, and, in particular, with a huge difference in between 
urban and rural settings. Uruguay is the country that has made the greatest effort to 
reduce inequalities, with a social model that is closer to the European one.
The fact that there are such a large number of informal activities in Latin America 
can be viewed, despite being seemingly contradictory, as the governmental ‘rem-
edy’ to deal with the issue. In a way, there is a kind of formal/informal complemen-
tarity, given its historical origin on the overlap between capitalist and non-capitalist 
practices. However, Structural Heterogeneity limits the state’s regulatory strategy, 
so it seems to have no option but to resort to resignation and functional adaptation 
of the formal economy to the informal one. Tolerance of informality in a large pro-
portion of economic activity is thus a short-term remedy to combat poverty. But 
such tolerance limits the coordination of pre and post-distributive policies.
2.4.2  Comparison of Models: Differentiation Factors
The participant countries in the INCASI project have different pre-distributive and 
post-distributive models. The differences between these countries do not only relate 
to their different levels of wealth, but also their different institutional arrangements 
of coordinated, semi-coordinated and uncoordinated economies (Hall and 
Soskice 2001).
To analyse the interrelationship between the eight variables considered in our 
model, we have applied a Principal Components Analysis to observe the inter- 
correlations and to reduce the information from the set of variables to two main 
dimensions or factors. Table 2.7 shows the variables considered and their correla-
tion with each of the two retained factors. The variance explained by both is 69%.
The first dimension is the most decisive, with 51% of the variance explained. It 
is especially defined by the unemployment coverage rate, social expenditure, and 
the collective bargaining coverage rate, on the one hand, as opposed to the informal 
employment rate along with indicators of income inequality, on the other. This 
shows that the greater the number of workers protected by collective bargaining and 
social protection, the lower the inequalities.
A second dimension of less weight, 17%, highlights the higher levels of income 
inequality associated to institutional coordination, opposing features in the first fac-
tor and that here tend to generate specific features that shift slightly away from the 
other indicators.
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The crossover of these two dimensions with the position of the studied countries 
is shown in Fig. 2.2, where four quadrants can be distinguished.
The first quadrant is made up of the countries with the highest informal employ-
ment, high inequalities in the pre and post-distributive Gini Indexes and a low 
unemployment coverage rate, such as Brazil, Argentina and Uruguay. The second 
quadrant is features countries that have high centralised coordination of collective 
bargaining and a high volume of social expenditure, such as Belgium, Finland, 
Table 2.7 Component matrix
Component
1 2
Unemployment protection coverage rate 0.827 0.150
Social expenses (in % GDP) 0.803 0.183
Gini pre-distributive −0.786 0.482
Gini post-distributive −0.782 0.513
Informal employment rate −0.751 0.398
Coverage rate of collective bargaining 0.721 0.581
Wage coordination: level of collective bargaining 0.684 0.564
Employment to population ratio 0.079 0.036
Source: Own elaboration
Fig. 2.2 Positioning of the countries. Source: Own elaboration
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Denmark and Sweden, countries that are representative of the Ghent System, neo- 
corporatism and coordinated economies (Hall and Soskice 2001), as well as others 
that are considered to be ‘medium’ neo-corporatist countries (Menz 2008). The 
third quadrant includes countries that share a decentralised collective bargaining 
system and therefore have large wage differences that are reflected in the pre- 
distributive Gini Index (Chile, USA, Ireland, United Kingdom, Bulgaria and Poland, 
among others). Finally, the fourth quadrant is made up of countries whose main 
characteristic is high coverage of the number of workers protected by collective 
bargaining, such as Norway, Holland and Slovenia, among others, and which are 
also considered neo-corporatist.
2.4.3  Similarities and Dissimilarities Between Social Models
Using hierarchical cluster analysis, we can now observe the distances, similarities 
and differences between the different analysed countries, taking into account the 
eight selected variables, and in order to group them into a typology of models. 
Standardising these variables, cluster analysis was performed by Ward’s hierarchi-
cal method. This analysis offers an integrated view of clusters of the most similar 
countries, with which the derived social models can be typified. Figure  2.3 and 
Table 2.8 present the formation of four clusters of countries as described hereinafter.
2.4.3.1  Cluster of Latin American Countries: Uncoordinated 
Informal Economies
Cluster 3 includes three Latin American countries: Argentina, Uruguay and Brazil, 
which share the phenomenon of Structural Heterogeneity. Four factors explain why 
they are located here: (1) they have a low, below average, level of social expenditure; 
(2) the number of workers with unemployment benefits is very low; (3) the inequal-
ity rates in the pre-distributive and post-distributive Gini Indexes are much higher 
than the average; and, (4) a high rate of informal employment, which hinders coor-
dination between pre and post-distributive policies. Informal employment makes it 
difficult to govern wages through collective bargaining, as shown earlier, so 
Structural Heterogeneity (Presbich 1981) leads to inequality in Latin American 
countries acting in a similar way to the way it does in liberal countries, despite the 
fact that these three countries have intermediate systems between coordinating 
wages at the sector level and collective bargaining.
In fact, Argentina, Uruguay and Brazil form a group with certain sector-type 
neo-corporatist elements (Marticorena 2014), with a system of collective bargaining 
at the sector level combined with a large amount of informal employment and very 
low coverage of unemployment. In all three countries, there are major labour 
inequalities between the formal and informal sectors.
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However, in Uruguay, the tradition leans more towards European social- 
democratic regimes. Meanwhile, neo-corporatism in Argentina dates back to the 
forties, and is associated with Peronism (Horowith 2011), as in Brazil with the 
Getulio Vargas era. Chile is a peculiar case, because it has gone from a state protec-
tion model to the radically liberal capitalisation regime that was instated in 1980 
(Castiglioni 2005). Mexico is another country where the state has retracted in terms 
of social protection.2 In turn, the reforms introduced during the last decade in Brazil 
have been gradual, although it is also a segmented model.
But the Latin American model, conditioned by the large amount of informal 
employment, has led to the construction of fragmented, stratified protection systems 
(OIT 2018), features major obstacles to guaranteeing social agreement and the 
2 Not included in the data analysis discussed herein due to the difficulties to find information.
Fig. 2.3 Cluster analysis. Dendrogram. Source: Own elaboration from ILO & OCDE data
A. Martín-Artiles et al.
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efficacy of wage coordination mechanisms, and means that its social contribution 
schemes are insufficient as unemployment benefits cannot be extended to a greater 
number of workers due to the difficulties with tax contributions and the aging of the 
population. For these reasons, these countries are classed as uncoordinated econo-
mies. Some analysts (Martinez Fronzoni and Sánchez-Ancochea 2018) define the 
trend among Latin American regimes as a struggle between universalisation and 
segmentation: universalisation due to the increase in welfare policies and segmenta-
tion because of the formal/informal (and therefore protected and unprotected) duali-
sation of the labour market.
In short, the theory of Latin American Structural Heterogeneity is based on the 
characteristics of the state model, one of whose features is the coexistence of formal 
and informal economic sectors, where the most protected activities at first tended to 
be prolonged, only to then stagnate. And the participation of low productivity activi-
ties in production and employment tended to increase (Del Valle 2010). We are 
talking about an organic cohabitation process in which protected, high productivity 
activities tend to resemble European activities in the same conditions. On the other 
hand, there is another important low productivity sector, in many cases with subsis-
tence activity, which tends to increase economic and, therefore, social divides. This 
process heightened the process of structural heterogeneity.
Given the Latin American case, it is worth asking whether the same is the case in 
Europe, with the segmentation of the labour market and a certain volume of infor-
mal employment in some countries.3 In short, it is worth asking how different social 
models have responded to the inequality that has been generated by the finan-
cial crisis.
2.4.3.2  Cluster of Neo-Corporatist Coordinated Economies
Cluster 1 differs considerably from the previous one, and is made of the countries 
with strong and medium neo-corporatist models, i.e. with centralised collective bar-
gaining at the national level and also at the national-sector level, as well as a high 
number of workers protected by collective bargaining (83.6%); a high rate of unem-
ployment benefit (68%); little informal employment (9%); high social expenditure 
(25%) and low inequality in the post-distributive Gini Index (0.271). Here we find 
the countries of the so-called Ghent System (Belgium, Sweden, Norway, Denmark 
and Finland), and also the Germanic countries (Germany, Austria and the 
Netherlands). All of these are classed as countries with coordinated economies, with 
institutionalised social agreements and centralised collective bargaining where 
macroeconomic policy has a ‘bottom-up’ influence from social agreements and 
3 According to Del Valle (2010) in Latin America neither is stratification an independent phenom-
enon from the forms of state intervention, for it responds to organised patterns, given how the State 
intervenes in stratification processes due to its role as an allocator of resources. In this regard, “the 
state defines the levels of commodification that operate in society since the practices of resource 
allocation reproduce, extend or reduce stratification processes”.
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negotiation. They have strong business and union organisations, mechanisms for 
monitoring and controlling wages to prevent dispersion, as well as policies aimed at 
mitigating the risk of considerable inequality in terms of income (Menz 2008). This 
data therefore agrees with the expected hypothesis: centralised neo-corporatist 
coordination reduces inequalities and promotes coordination between pre- and post- 
distributive policies. In this model, the inequalities expressed by the Gini Index are 
small because of the high amount of unemployment benefits and social expenditure.
2.4.3.3  Liberal Cluster: Uncoordinated Economies
Third, we consider the cluster formed by the countries with uncoordinated econo-
mies (cluster 4), with liberal labour relations (United Kingdom, United States and 
Chile, among others), with a decentralised collective bargaining system at the com-
pany level and low coverage of collective bargaining (26%), which influences 
inequality in the labour (0.394) and post-distributive (0.326) Gini Indexes. The 
unemployment protection rate is also low (27%), and the moderate volume of infor-
mal employment (19%) is below the average. These countries also have low social 
expenditure (18%). These are liberal countries that usually have micro-economic 
type policies, and have weak unions with little political influence for pre and post- 
distributive coordination (which is limited to the few companies where they are 
represented, and with low coverage of the number of workers, Molina and 
Rhodes 2007).
In short, both the decentralisation of collective bargaining at the company level 
(typical of uncoordinated economies), and informal employment (widespread in 
Latin America) generate strong dualized segmentation of labour relations, with a 
clear difference between protected (insiders) and unprotected (outsiders) workers. 
In conclusion, we could say that the results agree with the expected general hypoth-
esis with regard to liberal countries. The unexpected finding is that Latin American 
countries have very similar results to liberal ones due to the large amount of infor-
mal employment and weak institution of social protection; such Unemployment 
Benefit Schemes and Pensions System (see Chaps. 13 and 14).
2.4.3.4  Cluster of Mixed or Semi-Coordinated Economies
Cluster 2 is formed by Spain, Italy, France, Greece, Portugal and Slovenia. These 
are countries with collective bargaining systems that mix centralisation at the sector 
level, semi-decentralisation at the territorial or regional level, and bargaining at the 
company level. In these countries, trade unions hold political influence and capacity 
for mobilisation, and although this representation is fragmented it does help to 
obtain better results and to generate mechanisms of state ‘complementarity’ (Molina 
and Rhodes 2007). In these countries, business organisations are fragmented, 
although the coverage rate of collective bargaining is nevertheless high (71%) 
because collective agreements have an Erga Omnes effect in France and Spain, and 
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are extended in Italy, where unemployment benefits (46%) and social expenditure 
(25%) are slightly higher than the mean, although informal employment is also 
above average. In mixed coordination economies, the state plays an important role 
in correcting the dysfunctions of coordination mechanisms, unemployment protec-
tion is fragmented, and economic inequalities are greater than in the corporat-
ist system.
Finally, Table  2.9 presents a comparative summary of the four social models 
found. In short, we can say that the more centralised the models are, the less inequal-
ity, which demonstrates the greater egalitarianism among neo-corporatist regimes 
and reaffirms the general hypothesis. Neo-corporatist countries have centralised 
coordination and bargaining systems, which act like umbrellas to protect the weak-
est sectors during negotiation. We can conclude that countries with a high volume 
of informal employment are the most unequal, followed by liberal countries. Latin 
American countries appear in the clusters with the greatest inequality, while the 
countries with neo-corporatist labour relations are the most egalitarian, which con-
firms the general hypothesis.
2.5  Conclusions
Based on the above, we can offer three main conclusions: (1) a high coverage rate 
of collective bargaining helps to reduce inequalities; (2) the employment rate alone 
does not reduce inequalities, since jobs can be unstable, temporary, part-time, infor-
mal and poorly paid; and, (3) a high rate of informal employment conditions pre and 
post-distributive policy.
2.5.1  European Trends in Pre-distributive Policies
In Europe, the tendency in recent decades to make institutional pre-distributive 
reforms has been characterised by a series of changes of a liberal nature, which are 
leading to an increase in social inequalities in the labour market. Pre-distributive 
inequalities are reflected by the increase in the labour Gini Index. The trend can be 
summarised as a transition from the socialisation of protection towards the indi-
vidualisation of risk. This implies a change in the principles on which the socialisa-
tion of risk has been upheld, whereby we could be witnessing a paradigm shift 
towards pre-distributive policies, rather than post-distributive ones: in short, a shift 
from the benefactor-protector paradigm to the Active Social State paradigm (Vielle 
et al. 2006; Boyer 2005; Cassier and Lebeau 2005).
Regarding the first question asked at the beginning (What are the institutional 
mechanisms for coordination between the labour market and social protection?), 
we can conclude that the coordination mechanisms are the level of collective bar-
gaining and its degree of centralisation, as well as state regulation. We conclude that 
A. Martín-Artiles et al.
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a social model is defined by the way it coordinates between pre-distributive and 
post-distributive policies, which has led us to view collective bargaining systems as 
important for reducing inequalities in the labour Gini. Wage coordination through 
collective bargaining (and extensive coverage in terms of the number of protected 
workers) introduces egalitarian wage patterns, as has been demonstrated in 
Scandinavian countries, which have been classed as strong neo-corporatism. The 
virtuous circle in these countries consists of a high volume of public employment 
(derived from the Welfare State), which in turn leads to high rates of union member-
ship, which then puts political pressure on redistributive institutions. The experi-
ence of these countries shows that the centralisation of collective bargaining has an 
effect on redistribution and the coordinated economy model (Hall and Soskice 
2001; Molina and Rhodes 2007).
The state’s role is also important in the absence of a Neo-corporatist Social 
Partnership. In Spain and France the state plays an important role by granting Erga 
Omnes status (general effect) to collective agreements with the force of law, which 
is a way to influence wage behaviour and to align and coordinate salaries with the 
goals of economic policy.
Regarding the second question (How have inequalities been managed between 
2007 and 2017 in the European and Latin American countries that participated in 
the INCASI project?), we have shown that liberal regimes are more unequal. But we 
have also found that informality contributes to inequality, without countries like 
Argentina, Uruguay and Brazil necessarily being classed as ultra-liberal. But there 
is no doubt that informality is also a form of disorganised capitalism, where market 
logic and the subsistence economy prevail. Disorganisation and non-coordination of 
wages has similar effects to those in certain liberal regimes. The effort to reduce 
inequalities not only depends on ‘institutional arrangements’ (Hall and Soskice 
2001), but also on the economic cycle, as has clearly been demonstrated. On the one 
hand, inequalities in European countries increased during the Great Recession 
while, on the other, economic growth in Latin America has helped to reduce both 
types of Gini Index, although major inequalities continue to exist. However, the 
inequality problem is structural. We note that Piketty (2014) pointed out the exis-
tence of structural factors that generate inequality when considering the influence of 
such variables as education, vocational qualifications, technological innovation, 
segmentation, (weak) redistributive institutions, collective bargaining, labour con-
tract regulation and the minimum wage, among others.
By way of contrast between Europe and Latin America, it is Europeans (Schwartz 
2007) who have historically accepted the state’s role as a corrector of the inequali-
ties and imbalances generated by the market. This is an important point of differ-
ence with respect to the United States and Latin America, although in Argentina and 
Uruguay the state does still seem to be an important factor for regulating the econ-
omy and welfare (Del Valle 2010).
A. Martín-Artiles et al.
59
2.5.2  Discussion
The debate on the mechanisms for coordinating the labour market also touches on 
the varieties of capitalism and particularly two opposing models: that of Germanic 
neo-corporatism and that of Anglo-Saxon capitalism. Germanic capitalism is based 
on the idea of ‘social market economy’ that is included in the constitution of several 
European countries. Meanwhile, Anglo-Saxon liberal capitalism takes its inspira-
tion from the politics of ‘market discipline’. The debate is not only economic 
between coordinated and uncoordinated economies, but also a political and moral 
one. These two orientations also lie behind the policies being discussed today in 
Latin America.
The divides between formal and informal employment are huge in Latin America, 
which weakens the pre-distributive process itself, as a huge contingent of workers 
are left out of the protection system, which must then be compensated in post- 
distributive processes. The informal economy weakens the capacity to fill the cof-
fers of social protection. The neo-corporatist coordination model cannot be exported 
as the ‘ideal type’ to other countries because coordination requires connected and 
coordinated social agents (unions, employers), with the capacity to be representa-
tive of their social masses. Coordination can also be exercised by the state, but this 
requires the means and mechanisms for the control and inspection of labour.
The different models are not static. They are dynamic and are gradually changing 
as a result of liberal, neo-liberal or social-democratically inclined reforms, depend-
ing on the countries and their current situations. The trend is marked by a micro- 
economic orientation (Pedersini and Leonardi 2018), towards the decentralisation 
of collective bargaining, towards workfare and towards active policies. In short, 
towards the so-called Active Social State (Vielle et al. 2006; Boyer 2005). But there 
are also other trends that are headed towards the introduction of guaranteed univer-
sal income, conditioned income and raising the minimum wage. These political 
dilemmas are not isolated from the degree of potential social conflict, which is the 
other side of the coin. Consensus on order depends on balances that are closely 
related to cohesion and social integration. Consensus on social order depends on 
social institutions and not the market.
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